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ArticLe
declaring, exploring, instructing, 
and (wait for it) Joking 
tonal Variation in majority opinions
Lisa Eichhorn*
1. introduction
Few news reports regarding Chiafalo v. Washington,1 the Supreme 
Court’s 2020 “faithless electors” case, failed to note that Justice Elena 
Kagan had referred to both Hamilton and Veep in the majority opinion 
she authored for herself and seven other Justices.2 For a few days, legal 
blogs and social media also noted,3 celebrated,4 condemned,5 or debated6 
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I wish to thank journal editors Sherri Keene and Carol 
Mallory for their helpful insights and guidance throughout the process of editing this article.
1 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a state statute that imposes fines on electors if they cast their 
Electoral College ballots for someone other than the candidate whom they had pledged to support).
2 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says a State May Require Presidential Electors to Support Its Popular-Vote Winner, 
Wash. Post (July 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-electoral-college-faithless-
electors/2020/07/06/cf88f706-bf8f-11ea-b178-bb7b05b94af1_story.html; Mark Sherman, Justices Reference ‘Hamilton,’ ‘Veep’ 
in Electoral College Decision, Associated Press (July 6, 2020), https://www.dailynews.com/2020/07/06/justices-reference-
hamilton-veep-in-electoral-college-decision; Marcia Coyle, States Can Enforce Laws Punishing Presidential Electors Who 
Break Pledge, Justices Say, Law.com (July 6, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/07/06/states-
can-enforce-laws-punishing-presidential-electors-who-break-pledge-justices-say/; Greg Stohr, Top Court Lets States Stop 
‘Faithless’ Presidential Electors (2), U.S. Law Week (July 6, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
high-court-lets-states-stop-faithless-presidential-electors.
3 See, e.g., Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Upholds Faithless Elector Laws, SCOTUSblog (July 6, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/opinion-analysis-court-upholds-faithless-elector-laws/.
4 For example, “A Hopeful Citizen” tweeted as follows: “Justice Kagan drops a Veep and Hamilton reference in the Chiafalo 
v. Washington introduction. I love it!” @ThePubliusUSA, Twitter (July 6, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://twitter.com/ThePub-
liusUSA/status/1280146643413864450.
5 See, e.g., Gerard Magliocca, Pop Culture References in Judicial Opinions, PrawfsBlawg (July 6, 2020, 10:33 AM), 
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2020/07/pop-culture-references-in-judicial-opinions.html (“I’m against it . . . . 
Won’t all of this be really dated really quickly?”).
6 See id. (listing reader comments stating various opinions regarding the propriety of Justice Kagan’s references).
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her mentioning of the Broadway and HBO hits. But Kagan’s title-dropping 
is only one instance of a feature of any judicial opinion, including any 
majority opinion, that merits deeper analysis over the long term: tone. 
Taking “tone” in the literary sense of a speaker’s attitude toward a 
listener,7 this article posits that the genre of the majority judicial opinion 
leaves more room for tonal variation than many writers and readers 
may have realized. I will first elaborate on the concept of tone, distin-
guishing it from voice and style. I will next review the literature on tone 
in legal writing and then describe the specific dynamics of tone inherent 
in majority opinions. At that point, I will closely analyze the tone of the 
Chiafalo opinion, contrasting it with the tone of another significant 2020 
Supreme Court opinion, that of Justice Neil Gorsuch for a majority in the 
Title VII LGBT-rights case of Bostock v. Clayton County.8 Finally, I will 
conclude with thoughts regarding the value of focusing on tone and tonal 
shifts in majority opinions.
2. tone defined and distinguished
In modern literary theory, the concept of tone has been traced to 
I.A. Richards,9 a theorist whose front-page obituary in the New York 
Times noted that he “dazzled Cambridge University in the 1920’s with 
his works on criticism” and then, “decade after decade, generated new 
interest among intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic in the . . . power 
of language.”10 In Practical Criticism, his seminal 1929 treatise, Richards 
defined “tone” as the reflection of a speaker’s “attitude to his listener”11 
and theorized that tone was one of four ways in which a literary work 
communicates meaning, along with “sense” (the subject matter of the 
speaker’s utterance), “feeling” (the speaker’s attitude toward that subject 
matter), and “intention” (the speaker’s purpose in making the utterance).12 
In the male-centered language of the time, Richards noted that a speaker 
“chooses or arranges his words differently as his audience varies, in 
automatic or deliberate recognition of his relation to them. The tone of his 
utterance reflects his awareness of this relation, his sense of how he stands 
7 See I.A. Richards, Practical Criticism 175 (1929) (discussing tone).
8  140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status).
9 M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms 136 (5th ed. 1988) (noting that “[t]he modern concern with tone dates 
mainly from I.A. Richards’ definition of the term as expressing a literary speaker’s ‘attitude to his listener’”).
10 Eric Pace, I.A. Richards, Author, Teacher and Literary Critic, Is Dead at 86, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1979, at 1. The same 
obituary noted his popularity for decades as a teacher at Harvard: “When his audiences overflowed the lecture halls, he 
lectured in the street.” Id. at 36.
11 Richards, supra note 7 (emphasis in original).
12 Id. at 174–76.
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towards those he is addressing.”13 While some critics have used “tone” 
more broadly to encompass the speaker’s attitude toward the subject 
matter and general mood,14 or, in a different vein altogether, to refer to the 
quality of words’ musicality,15 I will use the term as Richards used it, in the 
sense of a speaker’s attitude toward a listener. 
Critics most often consider the literary speaker in a narrative work 
to be the persona that the author has assumed—that is, the one whom 
the reader understands to be telling the story.16 Thus, tone reflects the 
storyteller’s view of the storyteller’s own relationship to the listener or 
reader. The tone of a literary work, like the tone of a speaking voice, can 
be “formal or intimate, outspoken or reticent, . . . condescending or obse-
quious, and so on through numberless possible nuances of relationship 
and attitude.”17 When a literary work succeeds, according to Richards, 
its tone represents “the perfect recognition of the writer’s relation to the 
reader in view of what is being said and their joint feelings about it.”18 
Tone thus reflects a quintessentially human aspect of writing. Indeed, 
the perception of tone evidently requires a human heart, as some recent 
missteps of IBM’s Watson Tone Analyzer suggest.19
An author reveals tone most directly through word choice.20 Sentence 
structure, organization of ideas, and inclusion or omission of certain 
13 Id. at 175.
14 See, e.g., J.A. Cuddon, The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory 726 (5th ed. 2013) 
(defining “tone” as “[t]he reflection of a writer’s attitude (especially toward his readers), manner, mood and moral outlook 
in his work; even, perhaps, the way his personality pervades the work”); Kelly J. Mays, The Norton Introduction to 
Literature 546 (12th ed. 2017) (noting that “tone” is “an effect of the speaker’s expressions, as if showing a real person’s 
feelings, manner, and attitude or relationship to a listener and to the particular subject or situation”); see also Abrams, supra 
note 9 (emphasizing I.A. Richards’s definition of “tone” but noting that “some critical uses of ‘tone’ are broader and coincide 
in reference with what other critics prefer to call ‘voice’”).
15 See Bret Rappaport, Using the Elements of Rhythm, Flow, and Tone to Create a More Effective and Persuasive Acoustic 
Experience in Legal Writing, 16 Legal Writing 65, 68 (2010) (referring to rhythm, flow, and tone as “musical elements” 
that should be incorporated into legal writing); see also Richards, supra note 7, at 197 n.1 (distinguishing his own definition 
of “tone” from “the qualities of verse sounds,” but noting that such qualities “do enable us to infer differences in the way the 
reader feels that he is being addressed”).
16 Abrams, supra note 9, at 135–36.
17 Id. at 136.
18 Richards, supra note 7, at 198.
19 The Watson Tone Analyzer is an online program that “uses linguistic analysis to detect . . . tones found in text.” https://
tone-analyzer-demo.ng.bluemix.net/. Professor Jennifer Romig recently ran two versions of a mock email from an attorney 
to a client through the program. Among other results, Watson reported that the sentence, “This message follows up on 
discovery in Acme v. Client” indicated “joy” and that the words “enclosed please find” scored “high on emotional range” 
and indicated “anger.” Jennifer Romig, Emotions in Writing, Listen Like a Lawyer (July 11, 2017), https://listenlikealawyer.
com/2017/07/11/emotions-in-writing/; see also Kelly VanBuskirk & Matthew R. Letson, An IBM Watson Tone Analysis of 
Selected Judicial Decisions, 19 Scribes J. Legal Writing 25 (2020) (reporting results of Watson’s analysis of 12 criminal-
law decisions from New Brunswick, Canada).
20 Mays, supra note 14, at A15 (glossary entry).
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information also contribute to the tone of an utterance or writing.21 
Consider the difference between these sentences:
• “The patient suffered a low-grade myocardial infarction.”
•  “I’ve got some bad news: Michael Walker had a mild heart 
attack.”
•  “Mia’s daddy got sick and had to go to the hospital, but he’s 
going to be okay.” 
Each may have been uttered by the same speaker, but each reflects a 
different attitude on the part of the speaker toward the listener and thus 
has a different tone. In the first example, the speaker believes the listener 
shares a sophisticated understanding of medical terminology and is 
relying on the speaker for a quick, precise report on a patient’s condition. 
The speaker and listener are perhaps colleagues working in a hospital, and 
the speaker respects the listener as a trained professional. In the second 
example, the speaker perceives the listener as a layperson with respect 
to medicine who nevertheless can understand the gravity of even a mild 
heart attack. In addition, the speaker believes that the listener’s emotions 
deserve respect. In the third example, the speaker views the listener—
presumably a young child—as someone less sophisticated and more 
fragile than the speaker and as someone to whom the speaker owes a 
duty of reassurance. If we knew that the listener in the third example was 
someone more sophisticated and mature than a young child—perhaps a 
seventeen-year-old or even an adult—then we might say that the speaker’s 
tone was condescending or patronizing instead of gentle and solicitous.
Tone in this sense is related to, but distinct from, two other terms 
from literary criticism: voice and style. Most critics use “voice” to refer 
to the qualities indicating the “pervasive presence” of a particular 
author behind a literary work, a “determinate intelligence and moral 
sensibility” that “has selected, ordered, rendered, and expressed these 
literary materials in just this way.”22 Voice allows us to recognize a work 
as the product of a particular author because voice inevitably reflects the 
author’s persona.23 Thus, unlike tone, voice focuses on the literary speaker 
independent of that speaker’s relation to or attitude toward listeners.
21 See Cathren Page, Not So Very Bad Beginnings: What Fiction Can Teach Lawyers About Beginning a Persuasive Legal 
Narrative Before a Court, 86 Miss. L.J. 315, 326 (2017).
22 Abrams, supra note 9, at 136.
23 See Mays, supra note 14, at A15 (defining “voice” in a glossary entry as referring to “the speaker” or “the ‘person’ telling 
the story and that person’s particular qualities of insight, attitude, and verbal style”); Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in 
Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 Clinical L. Rev. 501, 503 
(2006) [hereinafter McArdle, Teaching Writing] (noting that voice “help[s] to distinguish individual writing”). For scholarly 
explorations of voice in legal writing, see generally Andrea McArdle, Understanding Voice: Writing in a Judicial Context, 
20 Legal Writing 189 (2015) [hereinafter McArdle, Understanding Voice] (positing the simultaneous presence of both 
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“Style” as a concept in literary criticism is also distinct from tone. 
Style normally denotes an author’s overall manner of expression and is 
independent of content; diction, rhythm, use of imagery, and various 
rhetorical devices are all components of style.24 Style is thus broader than 
tone: the rhetorical choice to manifest a particular attitude toward the 
audience—that is, the choice of tone—is just one of many ingredients of 
an author’s style. 
3. scholarly commentary on tone in legal writing
Scholarly treatments of tone in legal writing have tended to focus 
on advocacy and the appropriate tone to use in briefs; Kathryn Stanchi, 
Linda Berger, Bret Rappaport, and Elizabeth Fajans have all discussed or 
mentioned tone in terms of how forcefully attorneys should push their 
messages toward their audiences in written legal arguments.25 The work 
of these scholars represents a consensus that a measured, reasonable 
tone—as opposed to an emotional, aggressive one—is more respectful to 
the reader and thus more likely to persuade a court.26 If we think again of 
tone as reflecting the authorial persona’s attitude toward the reader, then 
it makes eminent sense to avoid the hard, hyper sell. No judge wants to 
get the impression while reading a brief that the attorney-author views the 
court as one of P.T. Barnum’s suckers.
Further, while not focusing on tone expressly, scholar Melissa Weresh 
has explored ethos in persuasive legal writing in a manner that relates to 
tone.27 In classical rhetoric, ethos is a means of persuasion based upon 
genre-based and authorial voices in judicial writing and recommending analyses of these voices as an aid to deeper under-
standing of opinions); McArdle, Teaching Writing, supra, at 503 (recommending ways in which teachers can help students 
maintain their individual voices as they enter a new professional discourse community); J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, 
and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 Legal Writing 67 (2009) (exploring the concept of voice in legal writing and advocating 
the express teaching of voice-related concepts in legal writing courses).
24 Mays, supra note 14, at A13 (glossary entry); Cuddon, supra note 14, at 688. Critics may sometimes use the terms 
“voice” and “style” interchangeably, but voice can encompass choices regarding what to express in addition to choices 
regarding how to express it. McArdle, Teaching Writing, supra note 23, at 503 n.6.
25 Linda L. Berger & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Legal Persuasion: A Rhetorical Approach to the Science 141–48 
(2018) (explaining how attorneys can establish a persuasive tone in their briefs by organizing content logically, acknowl-
edging weaknesses in arguments, and avoiding disparagement of their opponents); Rappaport, supra note 15, at 99 (noting 
that appropriate tone helps establish a writer’s credibility with readers); Elizabeth Fajans, Hitting the Wall as a Legal Writer, 
18 Legal Writing 3, 27–32 (2012) (using introduction sections from two trial briefs to demonstrate persuasive and unper-
suasive tone and “pitch”); see also Page, supra note 21 (explaining how opening sentences in both fictional narratives and 
legal briefs can set an effective tone). 
26 See, e.g., Berger & Stanchi, supra note 25, at 141 (instructing that “a more moderate, tempered tone is more persuasive 
than a one-sided, aggressive tone”); Rappaport, supra note 15, at 100 (advising that a “too strident” tone can backfire by 
making the reader feel “bludgeoned” and thus “angry”); Fajans, supra note 25, at 30 (criticizing as unpersuasive a brief 
excerpt whose tone is “aggressive and heavy handed”).
27 Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship, 9 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric 229 (2012). 
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the audience’s perception of the speaker. Aristotle’s Rhetoric lists three 
attributes that inspire an audience to believe that a speaker is credible: 
good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.28 Weresh posits that 
while these attributes of ethos may reside in the speaker (whom Weresh 
labels “the source”), the likelihood that the audience will perceive and 
be persuaded by these attributes depends upon the relationship that the 
speaker has cultivated with the audience through the speech.29 If that rela-
tionship is one of familiarity, similarity, and attraction, then the speaker is 
more likely to persuade as a matter of ethos.30
While the text of Weresh’s article mentions “tone” only in one very 
short paragraph,31 the idea inheres in her thesis to the extent that a 
speaker’s attitude toward an audience affects the potential for a positive 
relationship to form between them. The concept of tone also inheres in 
some of the advice Weresh offers to attorneys in the article. For example, 
she notes that attorneys should use “subtle” but persuasive organizational 
strategies that prevent readers from feeling manipulated32 and suggests 
that they might include references to literature.33 Such techniques signal 
a writer’s respect for the reader’s agency, intelligence, and education and 
thus predispose the reader to feel positively toward the writer. Thus, 
building on Weresh’s work, one could say that a writer persuades by 
creating a positive relationship with a reader, but also that the creation 
of a positive relationship depends in part on the reader’s perception of 
the writer’s attitude toward the reader—or, in other words, the reader’s 
perception of the writer’s tone. Indeed, Aristotle’s Rhetoric itself teaches 
that “it adds much to an orator’s influence that . . . he should be thought to 
entertain the right feelings towards his hearers.”34
In terms of judicial writing, scholars and commentators have often 
focused on style35 or voice36 as opposed to tone.37 When the literature 
28 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle 1, 91 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library 
College Editions 1984).
29 Weresh, supra note 27, at 235 (positing that “a positive ethos is based not only on the positive characteristics of the 
source, but on the relationship that the source is able to foster with her audience” and that an advocate should therefore 
strive both to exhibit “characteristics of ethos” in herself and to develop “positive source-relational attributes”).
30 Id. at 234.
31 Id. at 255 (“Style also influences the tone of legal writing and therefore fosters the relationship between advocate and 
reader.”).
32 Id. at 247 (discussing organizational priming as a subtle persuasive technique); id. at 248 (discussing foreshadowing as a 
subtle persuasive technique).
33 Id. at 262–64.
34 Aristotle, supra note 28, at 90–91 (emphasis added).
35 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1421 (1995); Patricia 
M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1415–18 (1995) 
(discussing judicial style and judicial personality). 
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on judicial opinions does discuss tone in the I.A. Richards sense, it 
does so primarily in terms of dissenting opinions, where individual 
judicial writers have the most rein to develop authorial personae and 
express their attitudes toward readers. J. Lyn Entrikin, for example, has 
studied the attitudes that Supreme Court dissenters have shown toward 
their colleagues in the majority, a critical slice of the readership of any 
dissenting opinion; she documents a declining level of respect toward 
these readers over the Court’s history and focuses on Justice Scalia’s 
notable lack of civility in dissent.38
The few scholars expressly considering tone in majority opinions 
have tended to treat the concept quite generally, casting courts and their 
readers in two relatively monolithic roles. As a result, these scholars posit 
that a particular tone, or at most one of two particular tones, either should 
characterize—or inevitably does characterize—all majority opinions.
For example, in a 1961 essay, Walker Gibson encourages appellate judges 
to consider four questions when taking up the task of opinion-writing: 
1. To whom am I talking – who is my reader?
2. What do I want my reader to do?
3.  Who am “I”—that is, what sort of speaking voice shall I project 
by the manner in which I compose my language?
4.  What relation should I express between this “I” and my 
reader—should I be formal or informal, distant or intimate? To 
use the literary term, what is my tone?39
The essay goes on to criticize a tendency of judicial opinions to 
adopt a “lofty” tone of verbosity and affected certainty.40 As a remedy, 
Gibson, in thankfully outdated sexist language, advises judicial writers to 
acknowledge opposing arguments and to strive for conciseness: “the tone 
should imply two busy men, writer and reader, both perfectly capable of 
36 See generally McArdle, Understanding Voice, supra note 23; Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and 
Emotions in Supreme Court Opinions, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 193 (2002) (analyzing the voices of eight twentieth-century 
Supreme Court justices); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 201, 204–08 
(1990) (identifying a “monologic voice” in judicial opinions).
37 While Richard Posner, in an article on judicial style, does briefly discuss “tone,” he uses the term more in the sense of 
register, or level of formality. Posner, supra note 35, at 1426–27 (discussing devices that raise or lower tone). Patricia Wald, in 
exploring judicial rhetoric, also mentions “tone” from time to time, but she most often uses the term to refer to the writer’s 
attitude toward the subject matter rather than toward the reader. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 35, at 1412 (“The typical tone of 
a dissent is troubled, outraged, sorrowful, puzzled.”).
38 J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia’s Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. App. Prac. & Process 201 
(2017).
39 Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 915, 921 (1961).
40 Id. at 924 (“In their effort at dignified conviction, judges may lose a sense of life’s mystery and complication, and by 
adopting too lofty a tone, they remove themselves from their readers.”).
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following an argument that is succinct, and efficiently composed.”41 Thus, 
although Gibson encourages the judicial writer to think of himself (or, I 
would add, herself ) as an “I,” his prescriptions imply that every “I” behind 
a majority opinion should be the same “busy man” who should express the 
same attitude toward the reader—yet another generic “busy man.” 
A more recent and comprehensive examination of judicial style by 
William Popkin discusses tone as a rhetorical component of majority 
opinions and recommends, as does Gibson, that judges avoid a tone of 
affected certainty, at least for opinions in truly hard cases.42 However, 
Popkin theorizes that only two tones can exist in majority opinions: an 
“authoritative tone,” which “speaks down to the audience” with decided 
confidence, or an “exploratory tone,” which “draws the reader into a partic-
ipatory community with the judge, wondering aloud about how to deal 
with the complexities of the case.”43 He notes that the authoritative tone, 
which masks the decisional difficulty in hard cases, leaves a “hollowness” 
in judicial opinions, and he warns that “a profession aware of its own 
posturing will provide a weak defense when confronted by a questioning 
public.”44 For this reason, Popkin recommends the use of the exploratory 
tone in such cases, noting its better “fit” with modern legal culture.45 
Scholar Robert Ferguson would contend that an exploratory tone 
is incompatible with the genre of the majority opinion; in a seminal 
article, he identifies a “declarative tone”—not unlike Popkin’s “authori-
tative tone”—as inhering generically in majority opinions, which, by 
their nature and to preserve judicial legitimacy, must “reach[] down from 
above in a way that can be accepted from below.”46 He posits this tone 
as one ingredient contributing to a necessary “rhetoric of inevitability” in 
such opinions and describes the declarative tone as one of “[h]yperbole, 
certitude, assertion, simplification, and abstraction.”47 Further, Ferguson 
41 Id. at 923.
42 William D. Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles 169–70 (2007) 
(stating that judges should “reject an authoritative tone [and] instead acknowledge the multiple values relevant to a decision 
and the resulting complexity and uncertainty in determining judicial law”).
43 Id. at 147. Popkin cites an opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes as exemplifying an authoritative tone in that the opinion 
summarily dismisses an opposing argument without explicit reasoning and states the majority’s premise with brevity and 
without substantial analysis. Id. at 152 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)). As examples of exploratory tone, Popkin 
cites excerpts from dozens of opinions of Judge Richard Posner in which Posner expressly shares doubts regarding the law 
and its application, thinks aloud regarding his analysis, and rejects bright-line rules in favor of more nuanced standards. Id. 
at 167–75. 
44 Id. at 173.
45 Id. at 177.
46 Ferguson, supra note 36, at 213. 
47 Id. While Ferguson’s article uses excerpts from two Supreme Court flag-salute cases from the 1940s to illustrate his 
theory, it also notes that this choice is “an arbitrary one in that any case or series of cases or level of cases might serve.” Id. at 
203 (explaining the author’s reasons for choosing as examples Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) and W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
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theorizes that “the listener-reader of the judicial opinion” inevitably 
“welcomes the declarative tones that make [the enterprise of judgment] 
possible.”48 Ferguson’s theory, while widely cited,49 spends little time on 
the individuality of writers and readers of judicial opinions. Thus, neither 
Gibson’s prescriptions, nor Popkin’s bivalent view, nor Ferguson’s theory 
leave much room for the possibility of tonal diversity in majority opinions. 
I.A. Richards himself notes that some contexts will constrain a writer’s 
tone. He offers the example of the author of a scientific treatise, whose tone 
is “settled” by “academic convention.”50 The treatise author, if “wise” enough 
to hew to convention, will show respect for readers and take pains to 
facilitate their accurate understanding and acceptance of his content. In the 
case of majority judicial opinions, convention—and the institutional role of 
the court—similarly dictate that authors demonstrate respect for readers 
and take pains to be understood by them. The legitimacy of the judicial 
system also depends on societal acceptance of majority opinions, and this 
dependence similarly constrains tone, as Ferguson explains. But within 
these constraints, a variety of tones can and does exist, largely as a function 
of how individual judicial authors envision themselves and their readers, 
who are actual humans, unlike Gibson’s one-dimensional “busy man.” 
4. the dynamics of tone in majority judicial opinions: 
as whom and to whom do their authors write?
4.1. Personae and majority opinions
If tone, in the I.A. Richards sense, is the attitude of a speaker toward 
a listener, then it depends on the identities of both the speaker and the 
listener. In the context of a majority opinion, the speaker is the persona of 
the opinion’s author—the “I” as whom the author has chosen to write. Of 
course, in the broadest sense, the authorial persona in a majority opinion 
is the court; by definition, a majority opinion speaks for the court.51 But 
different judges may choose to speak as the court in different ways.
Indeed, Christopher Rideout has noted that although “the task of the 
writing judge is to appropriate” the voices of all judges who voted in the 
majority “into a single authoritative voice of the court,”52 the persona of 
48 Id. at 211.
49 A Westlaw search on January 3, 2021, revealed over 100 citations to Ferguson’s article, occurring, among other places, 
in multiple articles in both the Harvard Law Review and the Yale Law Journal, as well as in four articles in Legal Communi-
cation and Rhetoric and another four articles in Legal Writing: The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute.
50 Richards, supra note 7, at 177.
51 Ruggero J. Aldisert, who was a federal circuit judge and noted authority on opinion-writing, once explained that the 
author of a majority opinion, “for the purposes of the case, is the designated representative or spokesperson for the court 
to all future readers.” Ruggero J. Aldisert, Meehan Rash & Matthew P. Bartlett, Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 18 (2009).
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the majority opinion is not completely pre-ordained: “The individual act 
of writing . . . represents an instantiation of those voices in a particular 
moment and context, and through a particular subjectivity.”53 Thus, there 
is some room to maneuver within the authorial persona, despite the 
constraints of the genre.
Some judges, for fear of making the court appear partial (or perhaps 
fallible), may choose a traditionally formal, institutional persona that sits 
well within boundaries of conventional constraints. For example, Judge 
Edith Hollan Jones of the Fifth Circuit has explained that she resists using 
the word “we” in opinions because she believes “that this pronoun casts an 
air of subjectivity upon statements that ought to reflect the objectivity of 
the law and legal process.”54 
Others, such as Judge Patricia Wald, who presided over the District 
of Columbia Circuit, have applauded opinions whose words flow from a 
more particular, human persona: 
I think it a good thing that judges write and reason differently—and 
recognizably so. It is no sin if the personality of the individual judge 
colors the opinion. It should be at least minimally comforting to a 
litigant to know that a live human being has brought her faculties to bear 
on his problem . . . .55
Even Judge Wald herself, however, confessed that she might have 
been, like most judges, “too timid” to inject too much personality and 
informality into opinions, lest she be viewed as insufficiently “serious” 
or accused of pandering to the public or the media.56 And, sometimes, a 
human persona can suffer from human failings, especially when colleagues 
on the bench disagree pointedly on a case: “If a dissent is outraged and 
self-righteous, the majority author will frequently rejoin in kind.”57
Judge Posner’s opinions, even when written for the majority, have 
a distinct persona. He once explained that he tried make his opinions 
“sound conversational rather than declamatory.”58 His persona has been 
described as someone in the process of thinking through the analysis 
of a case, openly admitting to doubt and exploring various avenues of 
52 Rideout, supra note 23, at 88.
53 Id. at 90.
54 Edith Hollan Jones, How I Write, 4 Scribes J. Legal Writing 25, 29 (1993).
55 Patricia M. Wald, How I Write, 4 Scribes J. Legal Writing 55, 61 (1993).
56 Id. at 63.
57 Id. at 57.
58 Richard A. Posner, How I Write, 4 Scribes J. Legal Writing 45, 47 (1993).
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resolving issues.59 Because his majority opinions explain the reasoning 
that moved him personally, rather than the common-denominator 
reasoning of the majority, they are more likely than others’ opinions to 
appear in the reporters followed by concurrences and dissents from 
colleagues.60 Nevertheless, Posner once wrote that his “nonstandard” 
practice of self-focus made his opinions “strong and honest,” which was 
better than being “unanimous.”61 The Posner persona thus resides at the 
edge of the envelope of conventional constraints regarding the majority-
opinion genre.
Justices of a system’s highest court find themselves in a slightly 
different position when it comes to the formulation of personae. On 
the one hand, their authority is famously final,62 so perhaps a justice has 
more leeway to be unconventional, even when writing for the majority, 
than does a judge on an intermediate appellate court.63 On the other, 
an individualistic persona may be “too intimate” to represent so august 
an institution, and Popkin has noted that Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court “might feel especially burdened by their responsibility and 
anxious to project an air of authority that could be undermined by the 
familiarity and uncertainty of a personal/exploratory style.”64
4.2. audience and majority opinions
The readership of a majority judicial opinion may be varied and vast. 
Some readers are insiders to the case: the lower-court judge or judges 
whose court’s opinion is being reviewed and the parties’ attorneys. 
The parties, depending on their level of legal sophistication and direct 
involvement with the litigation, may read the opinion as well. If the 
opinion was not unanimous, then the judges or justices not joining the 
majority will be the ultimate insider-readers. Indeed, when draft opinions 
are circulated among the appellate judges who have heard the case, then a 
judge or justice who originally voted against the majority may actually be 
persuaded by a draft of the majority opinion to switch votes and join in it, 
before the final version is publicly announced.65 A final group of insider-
59 Popkin, supra note 42, at 159 (noting that a Posner opinion “reads as though the author is thinking out loud about how 
to work through the issues”).
60 Posner, supra note 58, at 47.
61 Id.
62 As Justice Robert Jackson wrote, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (Jackson, J., concurring).
63 See Rideout, supra note 23, at 103 (explaining that Justice Stevens had the freedom to insert more of an “authorial 
presence” in a particular opinion in part because the opinion was a dissent but also simply because “as a Supreme Court 
justice he ha[d] both the legal and the rhetorical authority” to do so).
64 Popkin, supra note 42, at 175–76.
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readers is only potential but nevertheless important: if the opinion comes 
from an intermediate appellate court, then the justices of the highest 
court in the system will of course read the opinion if a litigant appeals and 
the highest court agrees to review it.
Among outsiders to the case, the most likely readers of a majority 
opinion are attorneys and judges performing research on the issues 
addressed, who need to understand the opinion’s precedential impli-
cations. Laypersons with a particular interest in the issues may sometimes 
read a majority opinion, especially one issuing from the Supreme Court, 
although most lay readers probably see only those snippets that have 
made it through the filters of journalists and bloggers. Academics and law 
students studying the issues are outsider-readers as well. 
These groups each have differing levels of legal sophistication, 
knowledge of the case, familiarity with the conventions of legal writing 
generally and opinion-writing in particular, and motivations for reading 
the opinion in the first place. And judges, while certainly conscious of 
all these potential readers, may aim particularly at one group or another 
when drafting a majority opinion.66 Naturally, the groups to whom a given 
judge primarily writes will affect the tone of the resulting opinion.
The Federal Judicial Center’s manual on opinion-writing explains 
that appellate opinions are written primarily for litigants, their counsel, 
and the lower courts whose decisions are being reviewed.67 However, 
a 1960 discussion at a conference for state and federal appellate judges 
turned up a wide variety of responses when the judges were asked for 
whom they wrote, ranging from “posterity” to “the losing lawyer,” from 
“law students” to “the bar,” and from “the legislature” to “the readers of 
the New York Times, or comparable local newspapers.”68 The discussion 
naturally included comments on these and other responses, with one 
judge noting that “posterity” was so vague as to be meaningless, another 
confessing that the idea of writing for law students “never occurred to 
me,” and another commenting that unless one is on the Supreme Court, 
having one’s opinion featured in a newspaper was so rare as to be “just a 
judge’s dream.”69 
65 The official website of the U.S. federal court system explains that Supreme Court justices may “switch their votes” in the 
process of reading circulated draft opinions. See Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited July 28, 2020).
66 See Posner, supra note 35, at 1431 (discussing audiences at which opinion-writers “seem[] particularly to be aiming”); 
Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1451, 1453 (1995) (identifying “litigants and lawyers” as the 
“primary audience” for judicial opinions and explaining that the author, a federal appellate judge, included detailed facts in a 
particular opinion to help “prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges in future cases” understand the precise holding).
67 Fed. Jud. Ctr., Judicial Writing Manual: A Pocket Guide for Judges 5 (2d ed. 2013). 
68 Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 810, 813–14 (1961) (describing a 
conference session led by Walker Gibson at the Appellate Judges Conference in 1960).
DecLAring, exPLoring, inStructing, AnD (WAit For it) JoKing 13
Such very human differences among judges did not disappear in 
1960,70 and these differences allow for, and surely produce, a wide variety 
of tones in majority opinions. A writer addressing “posterity” will adopt a 
different attitude toward the reader than will a writer who is focused on 
explaining to “the losing lawyer” why certain arguments were rejected. A 
writer envisioning a classroom of law students will project a still different 
tone, and one implicitly lobbying a legislature to amend an unworkable 
statute yet another. Indeed, in moving from one passage of an opinion 
to another, a writer may envision different audiences as the focus and 
purpose of the opinion’s passages change. Thus, even a single majority 
opinion may exhibit a diversity of tones.
5. a comparative study of tone in two recent majority 
opinions
At this point, some concrete examples of diverse tones are in order, 
and this section will focus on two recent Supreme Court majority 
opinions, one authored by Justice Elena Kagan and the other by Justice 
Neil Gorsuch. Both Justices have been noted for their writing,71 and both 
will likely remain on the Court for quite some time, perhaps continuing 
to evolve their tones and certainly influencing the writing of future judges 
and justices.
Justice Kagan was an absolute beginner in terms of authoring opinions 
in her own name when she joined the Court in 2011; she remains the only 
sitting Justice who had never served as a judge before her confirmation.72 
Of course, as a clerk for Judge Abner Mikva and then for Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, as a Harvard Law School professor and dean, and as the United 
States Solicitor General, she had influenced, written about, and generally 
marinated in Supreme Court opinions for decades.73 Her opinion-writing 
style has been praised for its accessibility to lay readers74 and also for its 
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Thomas M. Reavley, How I Write, 4 Scribes J. Legal Writing 51, 54 (1993) (explaining, as a Fifth Circuit judge, 
that “[w]e write to be read by lawyers and judges”); Jones, supra note 54, at 29 (asserting that opinions should be “compre-
hensible to an intelligent nonlawyer”); Posner, supra note 35, at 1431 (noting that some judges, so-called “impure judicial 
stylist[s],” write for a primary audience of lawyers and laypeople who can “‘see through’ the artifice of judicial pretension”); 
see also Laura Krugman Ray, “The Hindrance of a Law Degree”: Justice Kagan on Law and Experience, 74 Md. L. Rev. 
Endnotes 10, 10 (2015) (quoting Justice Elena Kagan as saying that she tries to make her opinions “understandable to a 
broad audience”).
71 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Elena Kagan Is the Best Writer on the Supreme Court, Slate (Mar. 1, 2016, 2:07 PM), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/03/elena-kagans-dissent-in-lockhart-v-united-states-shows-shes-scalias-successor-as-
the-best-writer-on-the-supreme-court.html; Ross Guberman, Neil Gorsuch Is a Gifted Writer. He’s a Great Writer. But Is 
He a “Great Writer”? Part One: Four Gifts, Legal Writing Pro (Feb. 7, 2017), https:// www.legalwritingpro.com/blog/
judge-gorsuch-gifts/.
72 Margaret Talbot, The Pivotal Justice, New Yorker, Nov. 18, 2019, at 36.
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“wit and pizzazz.”75 Indeed, she has been called the Court’s “most inno-
vative writer”76—and sometimes its best.77 Commentators have noted 
her frequent use of colloquialisms, analogies between legal issues and 
quotidian situations, and vivid language.78 She has explained that she wants 
her opinions to be “understandable to a broad audience” and to “sound 
like” herself.79 She recognizes, however, that when writing for a majority of 
the Court, she “can’t go to town” with her personal voice and may need to 
leave “some of [her] favorite lines” on the “cutting room floor.”80 
Justice Gorsuch had served as a judge on the Tenth Circuit for over 
ten years and had authored 175 published majority opinions before 
joining the Supreme Court in 2017.81 Like Kagan, he had worked as a 
United States Supreme Court clerk, in his case for Justice Byron White 
and then for Justice Anthony Kennedy. 82 His experience also included 
service as the Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General at the United 
States Department of Justice.83 When he received his Supreme Court 
nomination, commentators frequently praised his writing style.84 Indeed, 
an academic study of his Tenth Circuit majority opinions has noted that 
“Gorsuch’s writing style conforms in large part to the guidance of legal 
writing experts, who urge judges to write accessible, engaging, and 
even entertaining opinions.”85 Critics have been more divided regarding 
Gorsuch’s writing style in recent years, with some citing a tendency 
to overexplain that has inspired a hashtagful of mockery,86 but others 
continuing to note a gift for writing readable prose.87
73 Current Members, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 
2020).
74 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions, New Republic (July 28, 2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 92773/
elena-kagan-writings (praising Kagan’s ability to explain “the constitutional stakes in plain language that all citizens can 
understand”).
75 Stern, supra note 71.
76 Ray, supra note 70.
77 Stern, supra note 71.
78 Ray, supra note 70.
79 Conversation with Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, C-SPAN (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?308291-1/conversation-supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan&start=2782.
80 Id.
81 Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative Guide to Neil Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
Online 75, 76 (2018).
82 Current Members, supra note 73.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee.html?searchResultPosition=2 
(praising Gorsuch’s “talent for vivid writing” and calling him “a lively and accessible writer”); Eric Citron, Potential Nominee 
Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 13, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-
profile-neil-gorsuch/ (referring to Gorsuch as “a particularly incisive legal writer” whose opinions have “flair”).
85 Varsava, supra note 81.
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Stylistically, both Kagan’s and Gorsuch’s opinions share a number 
of features. Both writers use narrative techniques from time to time, 
both dispense with legalese whenever possible, and both use colloquial 
language, giving their prose a relatively informal flavor, at least for 
judicial writing.88 Commentators have gone so far as to describe at least 
one opinion of each as “breezy.”89 Yet for all this stylistic similarity, each 
deploys different tones in majority opinions, and each can use a different 
range of tones within a single opinion.
a. Chiafalo v. Washington: a case study in kagan’s majority-
opinion tones
A “faithless elector” is a member of the Electoral College who has 
pledged to cast a ballot for the winner of a state’s popular vote but then 
violates that pledge.90 The Supreme Court held in Ray v. Blair91 that states 
may extract such pledges from the electors whom they appoint, and 
Chiafalo92 raised the issue of whether states may constitutionally enforce 
such pledges—for example by fining faithless electors as the State of 
Washington fined Peter Chiafalo, Levi Guerra, and Esther John.93 These 
three electors challenged their thousand-dollar fines, arguing that the 
United States Constitution allowed them to cast their electoral ballots 
however they pleased.94 An eight-Justice Supreme Court majority held 
against the electors, finding no such right in the Constitution.95 Justice 
Elena Kagan authored the Court’s opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas 
concurred in the judgment but filed a separate opinion.96 
86 See Dan Epps (@danepps), Twitter (Jan. 23, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://twitter.com/danepps/status/955912760629526528 
(“Let’s rewrite some classic lines from SCOTUS ops . . . #GorsuchStyle.”).
87 Adam Liptak, #GorsuchStyle Garners a Gusher of Groans. But Is His Writing Really That Bad?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/justice-neil-gorsuch-writing-style.html (discussing critics’ mixed 
opinions).
88 See Varsava, supra note 81 (describing Gorsuch’s style as using narrative suspense, eschewing technical language, and 
being much less formal than average); Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme Court Opinions, 
89 Ind. L.J. Supp. 1, 6 (2012) (noting that Kagan’s style shows a recognition of opinions as “narratives”); id. at 9 (noting 
Kagan’s lack of “legalese”); id. at 4 (noting Kagan’s “informal and even colloquial diction”). 
89 Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Just Handed Down a Historic Victory for LGBTQ Rights, Slate (June 15, 2020, 12:19 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/supreme-court-lgbtq-discrimination-employment.html (referring to a 
Gorsuch majority opinion as “breezy”); Noah Feldman, It’s Okay to Laugh at the Supreme Court, Bloomberg (Mar. 4, 2016, 
9:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-03-04/it-s-ok-to-laugh-at-the-supreme-court (describing a 
Kagan dissent as “breezy”). 
90 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2321–22 (explaining the concept of “so-called faithless voting” by electors and the history of states’ 
treatment of “faithless electors”).
91 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
92 140 S. Ct. 2316.
93 Id. at 2322.
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2320.
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While Kagan’s majority opinion hews to conventions of the genre 
in that it is organized around traditional Roman-numeral headings and 
contains citations in the Court’s usual style,97 its tone is almost never the 
“declaratory” one that Robert Ferguson described, which speaks with 
“hyperbole, certitude, assertion, simplification, and abstraction.”98 The 
opinion does exhibit “certitude” in that it is never tentative in its analysis 
or conclusions (and thus does not exhibit William Popkin’s “exploratory” 
tone, either), but the opinion is devoid of hyperbole and contains a wealth 
of concrete details rather than simplification and abstraction. Nor does 
the opinion “speak down” to the reader in William Popkin’s “authoritative” 
tone. The opinion’s authority, of course, is inherent, and Kagan takes 
advantage of this fact as a writer to let tones do other work.
Indeed, the Chiafalo majority opinion exhibits a palette of tones as 
it proceeds from a brief introduction, to a detailed explanation of the 
issue (which necessitates elaboration of some Constitutional history), to 
the Court’s legal analysis, to—finally—a one-paragraph summary of that 
analysis. The introduction, in three short paragraphs, speaks respectfully 
and directly to a reader who is certainly an outsider to the case and 
probably to the legal discourse community. With the exception of a 
single citation, the introduction uses no technical or legal language as it 
describes the issue and states the Court’s holding: 
 Every four years, millions of Americans cast a ballot for a presi-
dential candidate. Their votes, though, actually go toward selecting 
members of the Electoral College, whom each State appoints based on 
the popular returns. Those few “electors” then choose the President.
 The States have devised mechanisms to ensure that the electors they 
appoint vote for the presidential candidate their citizens have preferred. 
With two partial exceptions, every State appoints a slate of electors 
selected by the political party whose candidate has won the State’s 
popular vote. Most States also compel electors to pledge in advance 
to support the nominee of that party. This Court upheld such a pledge 
requirement decades ago, rejecting the argument that the Constitution 
“demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice.” Ray v. 
Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952).
96 Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97 The United States Supreme Court has its own guide to style and citation. See Office of the Rep. of Decisions, 
Supreme Ct. of the U.S., The Supreme Court’s Style Guide (Jack Metzler ed., 2016), https://budgetcounsel.files.
wordpress.com/2018/10/supreme-courts-style-guide.pdf.
98 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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 Today, we consider whether a State may also penalize an elector for 
breaking his pledge and voting for someone other than the presidential 
candidate who won his State’s popular vote. We hold that a State may do so.99
The tone is respectful from the first sentence, which assumes no 
knowledge of the subject matter on the part of the reader but also avoids 
pedantry. It simply states, as a journalist might, a fact that would work for 
anyone as an easy point of access to a complex issue. The second sentence, 
with its informal “though” instead of “however,” adds a conversational 
note, as though a speaker is warming up to her subject in the presence 
of interested listeners. This straightforward, non-legalistic tone continues 
through the rest of the introduction. Indeed, the giveaway that this text is 
in fact a judicial opinion does not come until the seventh sentence of the 
introduction, with the reference to “This Court.” In the last two sentences, 
the “Court” becomes the eight-Justice Chiafalo majority with a formulaic 
“we,” but, based on the tone established earlier, the “we” does not sound 
particularly royal.
Part I of the opinion proceeds to a more precise explanation of the 
issue, which requires a constitutional history lesson regarding the Electoral 
College along with a tonal shift that establishes more intimacy with the 
reader. This part begins with the sentence “Our Constitution’s method of 
picking Presidents emerged from an eleventh-hour compromise.”100 Now 
the first-person plural no longer refers to the Court; instead, it refers to the 
speaker and all (American) readers as one unified group. The “eleventh-
hour compromise” hints of a good story to come, perhaps one told between 
acquaintances. The diction becomes less formal as Kagan describes how 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention accepted a proposal for 
an Electoral College, “but with a few tweaks,” resulting in Article II, § 1, 
clause 2, which requires states to appoint a certain number of electors in 
any manner their legislatures deem appropriate.
From there, as the text elaborates on Article II, § 1, the tone becomes 
even less formal and more intimate: “The next clause (but don’t get 
attached: it will soon be superseded) set out the procedures the electors 
were to follow.” This is not communication between Walker Gibson’s 
“busy men”; the speaker and her audience have become friends. Kagan’s 
joking aside is both ironically self-deprecating (“Surely you’ve been loving 
and memorizing everything I’ve told you so far, right?”) and slightly apol-
ogetic (“I’m sorry to bog you down with this legal detail, but trust me; I’m 
99 Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2319–20.
100 Id. at 2320.
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going somewhere.”) The speaker knows the listener well enough to have 
confidence that all of these messages will be received.
This intimate, friendly tone reaches its height with two paragraphs in 
Part I that recount what the opinion later calls “a pair of fiascos.”101 The 
first occurred in 1796. Because Article II originally required electors to 
each cast two ballots, with the ballot-winner becoming President and the 
runner-up his Vice President, it allowed for candidates from two warring 
parties, Federalist John Adams and Republican Thomas Jefferson, to 
become President and Vice President, respectively. Kagan’s opinion, after 
relating this story, notes parenthetically that “One might think of this as 
fodder for a new season of Veep.”102 Now speaker and listener are on the 
couch binge-watching together. 
The intimacy continues in the recounting of the second fiasco: 
Four years later, a different problem arose. Jefferson and Aaron Burr 
ran that year as a Republican Party ticket, with the former meant to 
be President and the latter meant to be Vice. For that plan to succeed, 
Jefferson had to come in first and Burr just behind him. Instead, Jefferson 
came in first and Burr . . . did too. Every elector who voted for Jefferson 
also voted for Burr, producing a tie. That threw the election into the 
House of Representatives, which took no fewer than 36 ballots to elect 
Jefferson. (Alexander Hamilton secured his place on the Broadway 
stage—but possibly in the cemetery too—by lobbying Federalists in the 
House to tip the election to Jefferson, whom he loathed but viewed as 
less of an existential threat to the Republic.) By then, everyone had had 
enough of the Electoral College’s original voting rules.103
One can almost hear the rimshot after the “did too.” And the reference 
to Hamilton, while unnecessary to the story and to the legal analysis 
to come, maintains the tone of close connection between speaker and 
listener, writer and reader, by drawing on common cultural knowledge.
The remainder of Part I explains how the Twelfth Amendment, 
ratified in 1804, ushered in our modern system of electors who vote 
specifically for President and Vice President with distinct ballots, and how 
states instituted popular presidential elections and statutory measures 
requiring electors to cast ballots for the winner of the popular vote. The 
opinion at this point also describes the state of Washington’s system of 
extracting from would-be electors a pledge of faith to the popular vote 
101 Id. at 2327.
102 Id. at 2320.
103 Id. at 2320–21.
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before finalizing their appointments, and of enforcing that pledge through 
monetary fines. 
This passage of the opinion eases off the intimate, joking tone of 
earlier paragraphs and moves toward a more pedagogical one, aimed at 
explaining legal complexities to an interested beginner. For example, a 
lead-in to a block quote from a portion of the Twelfth Amendment refers 
not to what its “operative language provides” but instead to what its “main 
part . . . says.”104 Another sentence refers to what Washington does “[w]hen 
the vote comes in” rather than “when the election returns are reported.”105 
And, like a treat for those who complete all of the assigned reading, 
Kagan drops the following self-referential note describing two states 
with anomalous electoral voting rules: “Maine and Nebraska (which, for 
simplicity’s sake, we will ignore after this footnote) developed a more 
complicated system . . . .”106 The “we” here refers literally to the majority, 
but it seems just as much to refer to Kagan and her implied students.
After explaining the procedural history and noting that the Tenth 
Circuit, in a different case, had reached a different holding on the ultimate 
issue than had the Supreme Court of Washington, Part I ends, as did the 
introduction, with another tonal shift: “We granted certiorari to resolve 
the split. We now affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s judgment that 
a State may enforce its pledge law against an elector.”107 The “we” is now 
unmistakably the majority, and the tone very briefly shifts from peda-
gogical to authoritative. 
Part II of the majority opinion describes the Court’s reliance on 
the text of Article II, § 1 and of the Twelfth Amendment, as well as on 
historical context, to conclude that the Constitution does not give electors 
the right to vote how they please. Kagan reverts back to a pedagogical tone, 
sometimes articulating a concept in two different ways to aid compre-
hension: “And the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includes 
power to condition his appointment—that is, to say what the elector 
must do for the appointment to take effect.”108 This pedagogical tone also 
manifests itself in down-to-earth analogies. For example, in explaining 
that the Twelfth Amendment’s use of the words “vote” and “ballot” do 
not necessarily give electors discretion, the opinion invites readers to 
“[s]uppose a person always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or union 
tells him to. We might question his judgment, but we would have no 
104 Id. at 2321.
105 Id. at 2322.
106 Id. at 2321 n.1.
107 Id. at 2323 (citation omitted).
108 Id. at 2324.
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problem saying that he ‘votes’ or fills in a ‘ballot.’ In those cases, the choice 
is in someone else’s hands, but the words still apply . . . .”109 Note that the 
“we” has now shifted back to embrace both the majority and the audience, 
teacher and students.
The rest of Part II maintains this teacherly tone, often speaking 
directly to the audience: “Begin at the beginning”;110 “Recall that in this 
election . . .”; “Remember that the Amendment grew out of a pair of fiascos 
. . . .”111 The diction remains free from gratuitous technical language and 
sometimes becomes colloquial: under the old system, electors “risked the 
opposite party’s presidential candidate sneaking into the second position,” 
and states enacted statutes “requiring electors to pledge that they would 
squelch any urge to break ranks with voters.”112 Thus, as the analysis 
proceeds, the tone is not as intimate as it was in Part I, but it remains 
engaging and cordial.
The final section of the opinion, Part III, is a one-paragraph summary 
of the Court’s reasoning that represents another tonal shift:
 The Electors’ constitutional claim has neither text nor history on 
its side. Article II and the Twelfth Amendment give States broad power 
over electors, and give electors themselves no rights. Early in our history, 
States decided to tie electors to the presidential choices of others, 
whether legislatures or citizens. Except that legislatures no longer play 
a role, that practice has continued for more than 200 years. Among the 
devices States have long used to achieve their object are pledge laws, 
designed to impress on electors their role as agents of others. A State 
follows in the same tradition if, like Washington, it chooses to sanction 
an elector for breaching his promise. Then too, the State instructs its 
electors that they have no ground for reversing the vote of millions of its 
citizens. That direction accords with the Constitution—as well as with 
the trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.
Here, the diction is more formal and sophisticated. The opinion is 
no longer speaking to a friend or a student; it is speaking officially, for 
the record, and the tone is much less personal and more self-conscious, 
dressed up for posterity. The “We” in “We the People” is not referring to 
a group of specific individuals but instead to a population with a public 
role. In this conclusion, which immediately precedes the Court’s judgment 
109 Id. at 2325.
110 Id. at 2326.
111 Id. at 2327.
112 Id. at 2328.
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affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, the opinion 
comes closest to manifesting Robert Ferguson’s declaratory tone.
In all, then, the majority opinion contains a few major points of tonal 
shift and manifests attitudes from warm and intimate to official and 
impersonal toward the reader, as the text seeks to accomplish different 
purposes. And even though the opinion speaks for eight Justices, it 
frequently bears the tonal hallmarks of its author such as informal diction 
and parenthetical asides. 
5.2. Bostock v. Clayton County: a case study in gorsuch’s 
majority-opinion tones
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 
discriminating against individual employees “because of . . . sex.”113 
Bostock, a consolidated appeal of three separate cases, raised the issue of 
whether an employer violates this provision of Title VII by terminating an 
employee based on the employee’s homosexual or transgender status.114 
A six-Justice majority held that such conduct indeed violates Title VII, 
and Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the Court’s opinion.115 That opinion 
drew two dissents, one by Justice Samuel Alito, in which Justice Clarence 
Thomas joined, and another by Justice Brett Kavanaugh.116 Thus, Bostock 
represents a more contested decision than Chiafalo, where all nine 
Justices joined in the result. This increased level of contention is evident 
in the tone of the Bostock majority opinion, whose implied audience 
most often appears to be those who would disagree with the holding: the 
dissenters, the losing litigants, and their attorneys. Presumably because of 
this differing dynamic, Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock uses a different range 
of tones than does Kagan’s in Chiafalo, with the Bostock opinion relying 
more on the declaratory and authoritative tones described by Robert 
Ferguson and William Popkin.
The introduction to the majority opinion exhibits a more emphatic, 
argumentative tone than does the Chiafalo introduction:
 Sometimes small gestures can have unexpected consequences. 
Major initiatives practically guarantee them. In our time, few pieces of 
federal legislation rank in significance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
There, in Title VII, Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace 
113 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
114 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
115 Id. at 1733 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in the majority 
opinion).
116 Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Today, we 
must decide whether an employer can fire someone simply for being 
homosexual or transgender. The answer is clear. An employer who fires 
an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for 
traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different 
sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly 
what Title VII forbids.
 Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated 
their work would lead to this particular result. . . . But the limits of the 
drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. 
When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual 
considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is 
the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.117
Each paragraph of the introduction contains an express declaration that 
no valid contrary arguments exist: “The answer is clear,” and “it’s no contest.” 
The use of “exactly” only bolsters this message. These words and phrases 
denoting certainty are markers of Robert Ferguson’s declaratory tone.
Nevertheless, the opening sentence anticipates an objection raised 
by the defendant-employers and by the dissenters: that Congress in 
1964 did not expect that Title VII would prohibit discrimination against 
homosexual and transgender persons. The reader encounters the 
word “unexpected” in the first, short sentence, and the final sentence 
emphasizes that the statutory language, rather than supposed legislative 
expectations, must govern the analysis. This strategy of anticipating and 
responding to a counterargument gives the text the persuasive, argumen-
tative tone of an oral argument opening. 
Gorsuch’s Bostock opinion also differs from Kagan’s Chiafalo opinion 
in its use of the first-person plural, which in Chiafalo sometimes appears 
to refer to the author and her layperson readers, along with the majority. 
In Bostock, if the phrase “our time” in the third sentence of the intro-
duction is ambiguous regarding who “we” are, the “we must decide” just a 
few lines later leaves no doubt that the “we” refers to the Bostock majority. 
For the rest of the opinion, the first-person plural will refer only to the 
majority or, in a few instances and with even greater force, to the Supreme 
Court itself, as when the opinion asks readers to “[c]onsider three of 
our leading precedents.”118 Indeed, later on, the opinion twice refers to 
the “cases” at issue in the Bostock appeal as being “ours.”119 This we-as-
117 Id. at 1737.
118 Id. at 1743.
119 See id. at 1744 (“The lessons these cases hold for ours are by now familiar.”); id. at 1753 (“Separately, the employers 
fear that complying with Title VII’s requirement in cases like ours may require some employers to violate their religious 
convictions.”).
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entire-Court usage gives the Bostock opinion a tone that is more expressly 
authoritative than the tone of the majority opinion in Chiafalo. 
Part I of the Bostock opinion proceeds to explain the facts and 
procedural history in straightforward language, neither technical nor 
colloquial, and Part II then sets forth the majority’s analysis regarding 
its interpretation of the key statutory terms: “sex,” “because of,” and 
“discriminate.” At this point, the opinion indulges in some of the over-
explaining for which Gorsuch has been mocked:
In the language of law, . . . Title VII’s “because of” test incorporates the 
“‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation. That form of 
causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have 
happened “but for” the purported cause. In other words, a but-for test 
directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. 
If it does, we have found a but-for cause.120
This section of the analysis, like some parts of the majority opinion 
in Chiafalo, has a pedagogical tone, but in this case the teaching method 
seems more like lecturing than leading a discussion. Questions followed 
immediately by answers move the audience through the talking points: 
“What did ‘discriminate’ mean in 1964? As it turns out, it meant then 
roughly what it means today . . . . So how can we tell which sense, indi-
vidual or group, ‘discriminate’ carries in Title VII? The statute answers 
that question directly.” 121 Further, the implied audience for the lecture is 
not the lay public—who are referred to twice at the start of Part II in the 
third person as “the people”122—but rather the dissenters, and perhaps the 
losing litigants and their attorneys.
As Kagan did in Chiafalo, Gorsuch in Part II of Bostock sometimes 
makes direct requests of the reader, in this case posing a series of hypo-
theticals that clarify the majority’s reasoning as to why “sex” is an inherent 
cause of discrimination based on homosexual or transgender status. The 
opinion, for example, asks the audience to “Consider, for example, an 
employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men.”123 And 
to “take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as 
a male at birth.” And to “[i]magine an employer who has a policy of firing 
any employee known to be homosexual.”124 At these points, the opinion 
120 Id. at 1739 (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 1740.
122 Id. at 1738 (“If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms . . . we would risk amending 
statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives. And we would deny the people the right to 
continue relying on the original meaning of the law they have counted on . . . .”).
123 Id. at 1741.
124 Id. at 1742.
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is no longer talking down to its audience; the pedagogical tone becomes 
more engaging, as if the speaker is reaching out more directly to foster 
among all audience members a precise understanding of the reasons 
underlying the majority’s interpretation of the statutory terms.
A tonal shift then occurs in Part III, where the opinion moves from 
explaining the majority’s reasoning in a relatively moderate, pedagogical 
tone, to discussing the employer-defendants’ losing arguments in a more 
confrontational one. Here, the attitude toward the implied readers—the 
dissenters—ranges from mildly tried patience to vexed disbelief. The most 
notable devices communicating these tones are a host of rhetorical questions. 
Part III itself, which follows the majority’s explanation of its analysis, in fact 
begins with one: “What do the employers have to say in reply?”125
Some of these rhetorical questions put words in the mouths of 
the employers so that the opinion can then respond to each opposing 
argument. For example, after explaining that the Court has previously 
held that employers discriminate because of sex when they refuse to 
hire women, but not men, with young children, or when they require 
women to make higher pension-plan contributions than men, the Bostock 
majority opinion proceeds as follows: “Aren’t these cases [i.e., the three 
cases consolidated in Bostock] different, the employers ask, given that an 
employer could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual without ever 
learning the applicant’s sex? . . . Doesn’t that possibility indicate that the 
employer’s discrimination against homosexual or transgender persons 
cannot be sex discrimination?”126 The response is immediate and short: 
“No, it doesn’t.” Of course, a detailed explanation follows, but this abrupt 
first sentence gives that explanation its impatient tone.
Other rhetorical questions, posed in the voice of the majority itself, 
follow quick paraphrases of various employer arguments. For example, 
the opinion at one point explains that Congress considered, but rejected, 
several proposals to add sexual orientation as a characteristic protected 
by Title VII, and the opinion’s text then proceeds as follows: “This 
postenactment legislative history, [the employers] urge, should tell us 
something. But what?”127 The “But what?” indicates again that the Court’s 
patience is growing short in the face of vague, unsupported contentions.
The most, and the most pointed, rhetorical questions appear in the 
final section of Part III, where the opinion addresses the employers’ “extra-
textual” arguments, which run most afoul of Justice Gorsuch’s textualist 
philosophy.128 In response to the argument that few in 1964 would have 
125 Id. at 1744.
126 Id. at 1746.
127 Id. at 1747 (citations omitted).
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expected Title VII to prohibit discrimination against gay and transgender 
people, the opinion first asks, “But is that really true?”129 Then, after citing 
contemporary examples of people who argued or predicted this broader 
application of Title VII, the opinion asks, “Why isn’t that enough to 
demonstrate that today’s result isn’t totally unexpected? How many people 
have to foresee the application for it to qualify as ‘expected’?”130 And five 
more rhetorical questions immediately follow these two, after which the 
paragraph ends by commenting that “[n]one of these questions have 
obvious answers, and the employers don’t propose any.”
The question that most persuasively makes its point does not need 
a follow-up comment. After noting that applications of Title VII to 
prohibit sex-segregated employment advertising and various forms of 
sexual harassment were once unexpected, the opinion simply ends a 
paragraph by asking, “Would the employers have us undo every one of 
these unexpected applications too?”131 Here, the tone has reached its you-
must-be-kidding crescendo of confrontation.
Finally, like the Chiafalo majority opinion, the Bostock majority 
opinion shifts its tone one last time at the start of its conclusion, where 
the opinion takes on a less heated, more declaratory tone that connects 
the ruling to its broader societal and institutional context: 
 Some of those who supported adding language to Title VII to ban 
sex discrimination may have hoped it would derail the entire Civil Rights 
Act. Yet, contrary to those intentions, the bill became law. Since then, 
Title VII’s effects have unfolded with far-reaching consequences, some 
likely beyond what many in Congress or elsewhere expected.
 But none of this helps decide today’s cases. Ours is a society of written 
laws. Judges are not free to overlook plain statutory commands on the 
strength of nothing more than suppositions about intentions or guesswork 
about expectations. In Title VII, Congress adopted broad language making 
it illegal for an employer to rely on an employee’s sex when deciding to fire 
that employee. We do not hesitate to recognize today a necessary conse-
quence of that legislative choice: An employer who fires an individual 
merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.132
128 Id. at 1749.
129 Id. at 1750.
130 Id. at 1751.
131 Id. at 1752.
132 Id. at 1754.
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6. conclusion
As the tonal analyses of the Chiafalo and Bostock opinions demon-
strate, authors of majority opinions can draw from a universe of possible 
tones that extends well beyond the declaratory, exploratory, and authori-
tative. Even within an opinion, the tone may shift as the text moves from 
one purpose to another—from describing the issue in context, to detailing 
the majority’s reasoning, to dispatching possible counterarguments, to 
announcing the ruling.
Paying attention to tones and tonal shifts deepens a reader’s under-
standing of a majority opinion by forcing the reader to consider why 
the author feels the need to address a particular implied audience in a 
particular manner at any given point in the text. Advocates, in particular, 
can benefit from studying tones in opinions because many of the devices 
that create forceful or persuasive tones in opinions can be adopted in 
briefs. And, finally, even though a majority opinion speaks for multiple 
judges or justices, its tone or tones can reveal something of its author’s 
judicial persona—the way in which that particular individual speaks as the 
court to the society the court serves.
